Minutes of Monetary Policy committee meeting (2002-02-06)
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MINUTES OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON6-7 FEBRUARY 2002
1
Before turning to its immediate policy decision and against the background of its latest
projections for output and inflation, the Committee discussed the world economy; money, credit and
asset prices; demand and output; labour market conditions; prices and costs; and some possible
tactical considerations.
The world economy
2
The latest US indicators suggested some further improvement relative to expectations a few
months ago. After falling by 0.3 percentage points in 2001 Q3, output was estimated to have grown
very slightly in Q4. Consumption had been stronger than expected, largely reflecting spending on cars
encouraged by heavy price discounting. A substantial part of this demand had, however, been met by
running down inventories, reducing its net contribution to output growth. Investment in information
and communication technology had in Q4 risen for the first time in over a year. While employment
had fallen in December, the rate of unemployment had also dropped, implying that some people had
moved out of the workforce. Looking forward, most of the recent US survey evidence was positive.
Measures of consumer confidence had continued to rise, and were now well above post-11 September
troughs. The Institute for Supply Management's manufacturing purchasing managers' index had risen
again, to 49.9. The non-manufacturing index had fallen only slightly on the month from 50.1 to 49.6
but by rather more when compared with the original estimate for December of 54.1. It was still,
though, considerably higher than immediately after 11 September.
3
In the euro area probably the most important region for assessing the impact of global
conditions on the UK economy there was a disjunction between the backward-looking data and more
forward-looking surveys. Demand and output growth had remained weak somewhat more so than
had been built into the Committee's November projections. But business confidence measures were
stronger, and purchasing manager indices had risen for the third consecutive month for both
manufacturing and services. Consumer confidence indices had been broadly flat on the month.
Compared with the November
Inflation Report assumptions, however, the immediate outlook for euro-
area activity was somewhat weaker. There was also a downside risk to domestic demand, but
compared with the United States the euro area was not particularly exposed to risks stemming from
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imbalances. It was conceivable that the current debate about the Stability and Growth Pact would
cause fiscal policy to be tightened relative to current plans, but that seemed unlikely.
4
Conditions continued to be difficult in Japan. Industrial production had fallen sharply over the
past year. Deflation persisted. Looking forward, there were downside risks associated with the
problems in the financial sector and uncertainty about their resolution. The significance of this for the
overall world economic outlook was, however, unclear as Japan's difficulties seemed not to have had a
big impact on global conditions over recent years; for example, world trade growth had been very
strong in 2000.
5
Against this background, the Committee discussed the risks to the US economic outlook since
that was the source of greatest uncertainty affecting global prospects. The underlying position in the
United States might be less strong than would perhaps appear from a near-term recovery in growth
associated with firms completing their inventory corrections and a rebound from the dip in demand
immediately after 11 September. What would matter more in the period ahead was the strength of
final domestic demand. While business surveys suggested that investment would not continue falling,
they did not yet point to a sustained pick up. There might still be an investment overhang, in which
case company spending would be weaker than otherwise. Perhaps more significantly, there were
downside risks to consumption from the build up of household debt. Even at low official interest rates,
the debt servicing burden was historically high relative to income. If saving were to rise sharply, there
might also be a fall in the dollar's exchange rate, which would in turn tend to reduce the real spending
power of household incomes. Separately, the Enron case seemed to be affecting the equity market's
valuation of other companies. Increased uncertainty about the integrity of published earnings might
perhaps be causing a rise in the risk premium; and looking forward, more conservative accounting
practices might reduce future growth in published earnings. However, the impact seemed so far to be
localised rather than across company share prices generally; and the effect on wealth and demand
would plausibly be smaller than would be the case if, say, the expected rate of return on capital
generally were revised down.
6
To the extent that weight was given to these possible downside risks, an important question was
how well monetary authorities would be able to respond if any of them crystallised. On the one hand,
while US headline inflation had fallen, reflecting lower oil prices, measures of `core' inflation (which
stripped out food and energy prices) had gradually edged up from around 2% to nearly 3% over the
past two years, perhaps prospectively reducing the scope for further policy easing. On the other hand,
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it was suggested that it was not unusual, given the lags in the economy, for core inflation to continue
rising during a slowdown in output growth and then to fall back as the economy recovered, so that
there was little reason to think that interest rates could not be cut further if the recovery stalled.
7
Overall, the Committee concluded that the international news on the month was positive. The
outlook was for world economic growth to recover during this year, but with somewhat weaker
activity in the near term than had been built into its November
Inflation Report projections. The
balance of risks was modestly on the downside.
Money, credit and asset prices
8
The global conjuncture implied considerable uncertainty about the sustainability of the current
constellation of exchange rates. The US dollar had strengthened again over the past month and, on an
effective rate basis, was at a 15-year high. But the internal and external imbalances in the US
economy, associated with the build up of debt, posed downside risks. It was difficult to envisage
recovery in the Japanese economy without some further yen weakness. The euro had weakened again,
and might be restrained by the subdued outlook for euro-area growth and by public commentary on
possible tensions between monetary and fiscal policy. But obviously not all of these major currencies
could fall at the same time.
9
Compared with the three main currency blocs, sterling's exchange rate was relatively more
important for domestic monetary policy given that the United Kingdom was a smaller, more open
economy. In effective terms, sterling was broadly unchanged over the month, having fallen against the
US dollar and risen against the euro. On balance the Committee judged that the risks to sterling were
weighted on the downside, although some members found that difficult to square with the possibility
of a more general realignment of bilateral exchange rates given the international conjuncture.
10
Recent UK monetary, credit and housing market data had been robust. The annual rate of broad
money (M4) growth had slowed slightly, to just under 7%, in December. But the household measures
were generally strong. Notes and coin had risen by 10% on an annualised basis in the latest three
months. Household Divisia money a broader measure of transactions balances had grown by over
9% in the year to end-December. Total household borrowing growth remained very strong: around
11% in the year to December. Secured borrowing growth had been over 10%. House prices were up
nearly 12% on a year ago on the Nationwide measure; and over 16½% on the Halifax measure, which
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had risen by 1.6% in January. According to the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, the balance
of estate agents across the country expecting house prices to rise had increased from +29 in December
to +48 in January.
11
The Committee discussed some of the possible implications of a substantial cumulative rise in
household debt relative to income and of the position of household finances more generally. Capital
gearing had also risen, but was still below the levels prevailing through much of the 1990s. Income
gearing was low at current interest rates by historical standards; other things being equal, interest rates
would have to rise substantially for income gearing to reach early-1990s levels.
12
It was not clear, however, whether the early 1990s provided a sensible benchmark of
sustainability. On the one hand, in an environment of greater macroeconomic stability, households
might be able to sustain higher levels of debt relative to income than in the past. They might simply be
making that adjustment; the debt-to-income ratio in the United Kingdom was not out of line with that
in many other developed economies. Official interest rates had risen by seven percentage points, from
8% to 15%, over a short period in the late-1980s/early-1990s. A similar absolute rise was now
unlikely. `Affordability' measures of housing for example, the interest cost of servicing a mortgage
relative to income were, it was suggested, reassuring. Nor was the level of household saving directly
comparable with past episodes; it was stronger than implied by the headline numbers. Measures of
the household saving ratio which adjusted for inflation were not markedly below the long-term
average; and adjusting for spending on durables on the grounds that they yield a flow of services
over time would, other things being equal, increase the ratio. Furthermore, it was not clear that
policy would need to be tightened sharply to restrain demand if rapid borrowing growth continued.
Other things being equal, higher debt as well as the abolition of mortgage interest tax relief might
mean that, compared with the past, smaller changes in official interest rates would be required for a
given desired effect on spending and saving decisions.
13
On the other hand, the high levels of debt in the late 1980s had made households vulnerable,
compounding the subsequent downturn. Was it clear that borrowers and lenders remembered the
lessons of that episode? The more stable monetary environment did not point unambiguously in the
direction of more debt being safe. The unexpected rise in inflation in the late 1980s had eroded the
real burden of household debt; that was also now less likely. In addition, the lower nominal interest
rates implied by lower medium-term inflation expectations meant that the real burden of servicing and
repaying debt was now spread more evenly over the life of a loan than during the higher-inflation late-
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1980s, when it had been concentrated in the early years of a loan. Related to that, measures of income
gearing based only on interest payments might, by ignoring principal repayments, underestimate the
household sector's overall debt burden, although some members thought that the quantitative
significance of this adjustment for most housing-related loans was likely to be small. Finally, it was
possible that the effect on household behaviour of any increase in interest rates would also depend on
the proportional change rather than just on the absolute change.
14
Persistently rising debt levels potentially increased the probability that any adjustment to
household balance sheets would be abrupt rather than smooth, with an attendant risk of a fall in asset
prices and, thus, in the value of collateral. In those circumstances, there might also be implications for
financial sector behaviour and associated constraints on household credit availability, which could feed
back into spending and so somewhat amplify the effect on aggregate demand. In the view of some
members, therefore, rising debt levels risked increasing the volatility of output and so of inflation in
the medium term, potentially making future inflation outturns more uncertain. Other members placed
little or no weight on this.
Demand and output
15
The imbalances in the economy had for some time been reflected in quite different outturns for
manufacturing and services sector output, and for consumption and investment. Manufacturing output
had fallen by 1.7% in Q4, and was 5.6% below the level of a year earlier. Services output had, by
contrast, risen by 0.9%, and was up 3.6% on twelve months before. The gap between the annual
growth rates had not been as big since 1981.
16
Retail sales had risen by 1.3% in Q4 and by 6.2% on 2000 Q4. The implications of the data for
December itself were, however, unclear. On an unadjusted basis, sales had grown by 23.5% in
December. But the seasonal adjustment factor was a massive -23.8%. On a seasonally adjusted basis,
retail spending had, therefore, fallen by 0.3%. Since there was unavoidable uncertainty about the
precise size of so large a seasonal adjustment, it would be premature to give much weight to this
month's data.
17
Consumption growth, while remaining strong, seemed likely, on the basis of available
information, to have eased back in Q4: from an average quarterly rate of around 1% in the first three
quarters of 2001 to, perhaps, around ¾%. This seemed to reflect weaker spending on services, which
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might in part reflect temporary 11 September effects. Looking ahead, it was possible that durables
spending would slow. As a share of total consumption, it had reached historical highs during 2001, but
had typically declined relatively quickly during previous economic slowdowns. Given the recovery in
consumer confidence, the buoyancy of the housing market and the robust household money and credit
numbers, there was not yet conclusive evidence that consumption growth would continue to slow in
the near term. The Committee still expected it to slow further ahead, reflecting earlier falls in wealth
and the prospect of weaker real income growth.
18
The outlook for investment would be affected by corporate profitability, amongst other factors.
Manufacturing profitability (as measured by the annual post-tax rate of return on capital) had been
only around 4¼% in Q3, the latest period for which there were data: the lowest rate since early 1992.
Services sector profitability remained much higher, but had now declined from a peak of around 18%
in 1998 to about 12½% in 2001 Q3.
19
According to the British Chambers of Commerce's Q4 survey, investment intentions in both
manufacturing and services were weak. But more generally, recent business surveys had been more
encouraging. For example, the Chartered Institute of Purchasing Supply services business activity
index had risen; and for manufacturing, the CBI Quarterly Industrial Trends survey was slightly
stronger than three months ago. More optimism in the corporate sector might improve investment
prospects in due course.
20
Overall, the Committee expected investment gradually to recover in line with aggregate demand
and output. But the immediate outlook was weak. In the view of some members, while in the short
run the balance of risks to consumption was on the upside, it was on the downside for investment.
Further ahead, the balance of risks to aggregate private sector spending was on the downside.
Labour market conditions
21
Although employment, on the Labour Force Survey measure, had increased by 0.2% in the three
months to November, hours worked had fallen by 0.6%, largely due to less overtime work.
Unemployment had risen slightly. It seemed, therefore, that firms were still hiring workers, coping
with shifts in demand by adjusting hours worked. The implications of this looking forward were
uncertain. On the one hand, if output growth remained reasonably robust, overtime and hours worked
might rise again, without further increases in employment; alternatively, firms might hire more
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workers, unwinding the recent rise in unemployment and leading to a re-tightening of labour market
conditions. In that case, consumption might not soften as much as expected. If, on the other hand,
hours worked recovered to earlier levels but growth stalled, unemployment might rise quite sharply.
The path of earnings growth could differ considerably between these scenarios.
22
Earnings growth had eased back slightly in the three months to November compared with the
previous three months. Regular pay growth had also slowed; on a non-seasonally-adjusted basis, the
twelve month rate had fallen back from 5.0% to 4.6%. Given that overtime pay rates were typically
higher than pay for normal hours, the fall might be explained by lower overtime. Bonuses remained
significantly lower than last year. Together with uncertainty about the timing of bonuses at some firms
over the next few months, this could make the earnings data difficult to interpret.
23
The survey data on employment intentions suggested that demand for labour had recently fallen
in services as well as manufacturing. Intelligence from the Bank's regional Agents was consistent
with this, and also suggested that on balance their contacts expected pay settlements and, to a lesser
extent, earnings growth to be lower in 2002 than in 2001.
Prices and costs
24
At a little over $19 per barrel, oil prices had been fairly stable over the month and, indeed, since
the Committee's November
Inflation Report. While some other commodity prices had risen, world
price pressures remained weak. It was noted that consumer prices had been falling in each of China,
Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong, which together accounted for approaching one fifth of world GDP
weighted at purchasing power parity exchange rates.
25
During its meeting, the Committee received the ONS's preliminary estimate of January RPIX
inflation. At 2.6%, this was much higher than expected. It would represent a sharp rise from 1.9% in
December, and was well above the increase which could be accounted for by the unwinding of low
petrol prices a year ago. Some of the unexpected increase reflected seasonal food prices, but on a first
reading some of the other contributory factors were not so obviously erratic. The Committee agreed
that a full analysis of the data would be needed before its March meeting. The data underlined the
volatility of annual RPIX inflation from month to month. The short-term risks to RPIX inflation
appeared to lie on the upside in Q1 and on the downside in Q2.
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The February GDP growth and inflation projections
26
The Committee reached its policy decision in the light of the projections to be published in the
Inflation Report on Wednesday 13 February.
27
On the assumption of an unchanged official repo rate of 4% over the next two years, the central
projection was for the annual rate of GDP growth to ease back slightly during the first half of 2002,
before recovering to around trend. The central projection for inflation was below target over the next
year or so, after which it rose back towards the 2½% target by the two-year horizon, when it was still
slightly below the target but rising. In the
Inflation Report fan charts, the balance of risks to growth
was on the downside, reflecting the risks to the world economic outlook and to private sector domestic
demand. The risks to inflation were weighted slightly to the upside, largely due to the effect on import
prices of a possible sterling depreciation.
28
Some members preferred different assumptions for both the central projections and risks. Some
thought that the most likely outlook for inflation was a little higher. Others thought that it could be up
to a quarter of a percentage point lower a smaller difference than in recent quarters reflecting views
that there would be a greater-than-assumed disinflationary effect from weak world price inflation and
that the economy's supply potential was higher than assumed; this was shown in Table 6.B of the
Inflation Report. On risks, some members placed greater weight on upside risks to both output and
inflation. Others judged that the overall balance of risks around the central projection was weighted to
the downside for both output and inflation, and in particular did not place much weight on the
possibility of a sterling depreciation or on its estimated effect on inflation.
Possible tactical considerations
29
The Committee noted that there was a firm expectation, in financial markets and amongst
commentators, that the repo rate would be unchanged this month.
30
The Committee noted that some commentators had advocated intervention in the foreign
exchange markets in an attempt to moderate the strength of sterling's exchange rate. The Committee
was clearly of the view that intervention was not likely, on its own, to be effective in the present
circumstances.
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31
The Committee reviewed a range of possible general considerations bearing on the relationship
between its fan chart projections and its policy decisions. First, it was important to place weight not
just on the central (modal) projection but also on the risks, and just as important on the economic
factors and analysis behind the fan charts. Second, the fan charts sometimes reflected some low
probability, high impact events, which there was no need for policy to anticipate because the
Committee could respond to them if and when they crystallised. Third, there were some eventualities
(for example, an oil price rise) for which, if they occurred, the appropriate course might be for the
Committee to accommodate the first round effects on the price level (and so measured inflation),
depending on the economic circumstances prevailing. Fourth, the weight placed on the projection of
inflation at the two-year horizon should reflect the nature of the economic influences underlying that
projection and whether, in consequence, inflation was projected to be stable, rising or falling then.
Fifth, the Committee might sometimes give weight to the expected variability of output and inflation;
for example, to whether there were factors which might affect the risks of missing the inflation target,
in either direction, by a material amount in the medium term. How much weight should properly be
given to these different considerations would vary with the circumstances. The constant factor was the
need, under the Government's remit, to set policy in order to achieve the inflation target. The
Committee's projections were, therefore, a vital input to its decisions since they were forward looking.
The immediate policy decision
32
Various arguments given different weights by different members were identified for leaving
the repo rate unchanged. First, with the central projection for inflation at the two year horizon only
slightly below the 2½% target and rising, for some members the Committee's projections were in
principle consistent with leaving the repo rate unchanged, cutting it slightly or even with raising it
slightly. As things currently stood, the outlook was sufficiently close to target that the forecast did not
help inform the choice between marginally different policy settings, as a range of interest rate paths
could be consistent with achieving the inflation target over the medium term. But in the current
conjuncture, cutting rates would undesirably stimulate an already buoyant household sector; and with
price pressures currently so benign, a rate increase would be premature. The best course was to leave
rates unchanged. Second, some members emphasised the prospect that inflation would be rising at the
two year horizon. There would be a risk to the effectiveness of policy if the Committee were to cut
rates now only to have to increase them quite shortly afterwards even in the absence of news. It was
preferable for the Committee to build and maintain a reputation for making policy settings which
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would persist unless economic circumstances changed. That way, repo rate changes would tend to
have a bigger impact on longer-term interest rates, the exchange rate and other asset prices, aiding the
effectiveness of policy. Third, some members placed weight on upside risks to the inflation outlook.
Two main risks to inflation were emphasised: from the possibility of a depreciation of sterling's
exchange rate and from the possibility that consumption would not slow as much as projected. These
risks were connected, given the imbalances in the economy. There was evidence that the exchange
rate was overvalued. The skew to the exchange rate built into the published fan charts was reasonable:
it was, for example, fairly close to the profile which would be implied by uncovered-interest-rate
parity, which was a conditioning assumption in some outside forecasts. Other members placed less
weight on the exchange rate risk in the published fan charts either because they thought the
probability of a depreciation was low or because the pass through to prices would be small or because
policy could react if and when sterling fell. But they shared a concern about over-stimulating
household spending. A fourth reason identified for maintaining the Bank's repo rate at 4% arose,
therefore, from the possibility, suggested by recent outturns, that consumption growth now responded
more strongly and more quickly to interest rate changes than in the past. Since consumption growth
was not expected to moderate until the second half of the year, cutting interest rates now would
stimulate household spending too much in the short run. A preferable course would be to leave rates
unchanged for now, cutting them if necessary later in the year as and when domestic demand growth
slowed and when the path of the international economy was clearer. Fifth, some members placed
weight on risks to the future variance of inflation from high and rising levels of household debt. A cut
in rates would encourage further borrowing, increasing the risk of a subsequent abrupt downward
adjustment in household spending and perhaps in asset prices at some point, which in turn would
increase the volatility of inflation around the target. Finally, the news that the January RPIX inflation
outturn was expected to be 2.6% raised the possibility that inflationary pressures might not, in fact, be
as benign as had been thought. The data would need to be analysed carefully in order to form a
judgment on how erratic they were.
33
Various arguments again given different weights by different members were also identified
for cutting the repo rate. First, the central projection for inflation was below the 2½% target
throughout the two-year forecast period. That created a prima facie case for a rate cut, especially
given the need for symmetry in policy reactions. Second, it was possible that the US economy might
not recover steadily this year given the possibility of a continuing investment overhang, of households
and firms repairing balance sheets stretched by the build up of debt, and of a further equity market
correction. Third, there were signs for example, from the Enron fallout, the just-announced Allied
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Irish Bank losses, and from Japan of somewhat greater financial fragility, which might dampen asset
prices, reducing wealth and increasing the cost of capital. Fourth, for some members the central
projections for output and inflation were too high, as reported in Table 6.B of the
Inflation Report; and
the balance of risks for both was clearly on the downside. There was too much uncertainty for weight
to be given to the implied projection beyond two years and thus to the slope of the projection at the
two-year horizon. The arguments for delay did not appear convincing given that, despite the buoyancy
of consumption, GDP was expected in the short term to remain growing at below trend and that the
main risk to consumption further out was on the downside. The upside risk to inflation from a possible
sterling depreciation built into the published fan charts was not relevant to the immediate policy
decision. The risks to sterling might not even be on the downside and the associated inflationary
implications had almost certainly been overestimated. Moreover, if sterling did fall, there would be
time to assess and react to the potential medium-term inflationary implications. The implications of
imbalances for policy were not clear-cut. For example, not cutting rates because of concerns about
growing household indebtedness might imply a higher exchange rate than otherwise, which could
increase future inflation volatility. It would, therefore, be a mistake to keep interest rates higher
because of the imbalances, as there was no compelling, commonly agreed reason to do so, and there
was, therefore, a risk of compromising the transparency and predictability of policy. On that view, a
further modest cut was, therefore, needed now in order to meet the inflation target, and there were no
good tactical reasons for delay.
34
The Governor invited members to vote on the proposition that the Bank's repo rate should be
maintained at 4%. Seven members of the Committee (the Governor, Mervyn King, David Clementi,
Kate Barker, Charles Bean, Stephen Nickell and Ian Plenderleith) voted in favour. Christopher
Allsopp and Sushil Wadhwani voted against, preferring a reduction in the repo rate of 25 basis points.
35
The following members of the Committee were present:
Eddie George, GovernorMervyn King, Deputy Governor responsible for monetary policyDavid Clementi, Deputy Governor responsible for financial stabilityChristopher AllsoppKate BarkerCharles BeanStephen NickellIan PlenderleithSushil Wadhwani
Gus O'Donnell was present as the Treasury representative.
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ANNEX: SUMMARY OF DATA PRESENTED BY BANK STAFF
A1
This Annex summarises the analysis presented by Bank staff to the Monetary Policy Committee
on 1 February 2002, in advance of its meeting on 6-7 February. At the start of the Committee meeting
itself, members were made aware of information that had subsequently become available, and that
information is included in this Annex.
I
The international environment
A2
According to the advance estimate, US GDP in 2001 Q4 had grown by 0.1% on a quarter
earlier, following a fall of 0.3% in Q3. Consumption had grown by 1.3% on a quarter earlier, with
sales of motor vehicles having risen by 16%. Investment had fallen by 2.9% in Q4, though investment
in information and communications technology (ICT) goods had risen by 0.1% on a quarter earlier, the
first increase for four quarters. Declining inventories had made a further negative contribution to GDP
growth, of -0.6 percentage points. Both imports and exports had continued to fall, with net trade
contributing -0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in Q4. Non-farm business sector productivity had
grown by 0.9% on the previous quarter.
A3
The Conference Board and University of Michigan measures of US consumer confidence had
risen in January. The Conference Board measure had risen to 97.3, from 94.6 in December, while the
Michigan measure had risen to 93.0, from 88.8. Both rises had been accounted for by increases in the
future expectations components of the indices. New orders for non-defence capital goods had
increased for the third consecutive month in December, by 0.9% on a month earlier. The Institute for
Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing sector purchasing managers' index had also increased, to
49.9 in January from 48.2 in December. The headline business activity index for the
non-manufacturing ISM survey had fallen to 49.6 in January, from 50.1 in December. Non-farm
payrolls had fallen by 89,000 in January, following a 130,000 fall in December. The unemployment
rate had fallen to 5.6% in January from 5.8% in December. Initial unemployment insurance claims had
declined again in January.
A4
The Federal Statistics Office in Germany had released an initial (working-day adjusted)
estimate for GDP growth in 2001 of 0.8%, down from 3.2% in 2000. The Bank of France had released
an estimate for French GDP growth of 2.1% in 2001. In the euro area, industrial production had fallen
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in November by 0.8% on a month earlier. Euro-area retail sales had increased by 1.2% in the same
month, reversing the 1.0% fall that had occurred in October.
A5
The euro-area purchasing managers' index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector had risen to 46.2
in January from 44.1 in December, the third consecutive monthly increase. The service sector PMI had
also increased, to 51.0 in January from 49.2 in December. The confidence indicator in the European
Commission business survey had risen in January, to -14 from -17 in December. The confidence
indicator in the consumer survey had weakened slightly over the same period. In France, the National
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) manufacturers' confidence index had increased in
January, due to an improvement in the expectations of future conditions sub-index. The Italian Institute
of Economic Studies (ISAE) business confidence index had also improved in December. In Germany,
the IFO index of business confidence in western Germany had increased to 86.3 in January from 85.8
in December, with the increase concentrated in the manufacturing sector. The Centre for European
Economic Research (ZEW) index of economic sentiment had risen to 35.9 in January from 25.8 in
December. The German unemployment rate had increased in January to 9.6%, from 9.5% in
December.
A6
In Japan, industrial production had increased by 2.1% in December on a month earlier. The
level of industrial production in 2001 Q4 had been 2.4% below that in Q3. Inventories had also
declined in Q4, by 3.4%. Electrical machinery production had increased in December by 3.5% on a
month earlier, the first monthly rise since December 2000. Electrical machinery inventories had
continued to decline, falling by 4.4% in December. Export volumes had declined by 15.3% in the year
to December. Real retail sales (deflated by the consumer price index) had fallen by 1.9% in 2001 Q4.
A7
South Korean industrial production had grown in December by 3.3% on a year earlier, while the
rate of decline in industrial production in Taiwan had continued to slow. The Consensus Economics
survey of GDP growth forecasts for South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia in 2002 had been
revised up in January. The 2002 Consensus forecast for China had remained unchanged between
December and January, at 7.2%. Industrial production in Argentina had fallen in December by 18.3%
on a year earlier. The Consensus forecast for growth in 2002 in Argentina had been revised down to
-8.2% in January from -3.3% in December, while the forecast for Brazil had remained unchanged at
2.1%.
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A8
The spot price for Brent crude oil had remained little changed from the time of the Committee's
previous meeting, at around $20 per barrel. The
Economist all-item dollar price index had also been
little changed from the Committee's previous meeting. The industrial metals index had fallen by 4%
over the same period, but remained 10% above its mid-November level. The
Economist non-food
agricultural commodities price index had risen by 6%; the food commodity index had fallen by 1%.
The price of computer memory chips had fallen since the Committee's previous meeting, but remained
substantially above the low point in prices reached in the autumn.
A9
In the United States, producer prices had fallen by 1.8% in the year to December, following a
1.1% fall in the year to November. The fall had been largely attributable to weaker energy prices. Core
producer prices, excluding food and energy, had risen by 0.7% in the year to December. Annual
consumer price inflation in the United States had fallen to 1.6% in December from 1.9% in November,
which had again been attributable to the decline in energy prices. Annual core consumer price inflation
had fallen to 2.7% in December from 2.8% in November. Producer prices in the euro area had fallen
by 1.3% in the year to November and by 1.1% in the year to December. German producer prices had
risen by 0.1% in the year to December. The euro-area harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP)
had risen by 2.1% in the year to December, unchanged from November. The preliminary estimate for
annual euro-area HICP inflation in January suggested a rise to 2.5%. Preliminary annual German HICP
inflation had been 2.2% in January, up from 1.5% in December. The rise had been attributable to
increases in indirect taxes and seasonal food prices.
A10
Major international equity indices had fallen since 9 January. In the United States, the S&P 500
had fallen by 6.2%; in the euro area, the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx index had fallen by 5.7%; and, in
Japan, the Topix had fallen by 10.0%. Spreads over government bonds in the Merrill Lynch aggregate
indices of investment-grade corporate bonds had risen for dollar and euro issuance.
II
Monetary and financial conditions
A11
The twelve-month growth rate of notes and coin had fallen slightly to 8.0% in January from (a
revised) 8.2% in December. The three-month annualised growth rate had risen to 10.1% in January,
compared with 8.6% in December. The twelve-month growth rate of M4 had fallen substantially, to
6.7% in December compared with 8.0% in November. The twelve-month growth rate of M4 lending
(excluding the effects of securitisations) had fallen to 8.9% in December.
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A12
The twelve-month growth rate of households' M4 had fallen to 8.0% in December. The
twelve-month growth rate of households' Divisia had remained above that of households' M4 growth,
at 9.2% in 2001 Q4. The twelve-month growth rate of households' M4 lending (excluding the effects
of securitisations) had risen to 11.0% in December.
A13
Within total lending to individuals, annual growth of secured lending had risen to 10.2% in
December. The number of loan approvals for house purchases had risen slightly, and the annual
growth rate of unsecured lending had risen to 14.0% in December.
A14
The twelve-month growth rate of private non-financial corporations' (PNFCs') M4 deposits had
risen to 6.8% in December. The twelve-month growth rate of PNFCs' M4 lending (excluding the
effects of securitisations) had fallen to 8.5%. The average monthly flow of total external corporate
finance had fallen to £3.3 billion in 2001 Q4. Growth of sterling lending to the manufacturing sector
had contracted rapidly in 2001 Q4, although growth of lending to the real estate, construction and
services sectors had remained strong. Corporates' net recourse (calculated using M4 lending adjusted
for the effects of securitisations) was positive in 2001 Q4 at £0.5 billion.
A15
The twelve-month growth rate of other financial corporations' (OFCs') M4 deposits had fallen
sharply in December, to 3.4%. The twelve-month growth rate of OFCs' M4 lending (excluding the
effects of securitisations) had also fallen sharply in December, to 4.1%.
A16
Short-term nominal interest rates had fallen at all but the very shortest maturities since the
Committee's previous meeting. The general collateral repo two-week forward rate had fallen by
around 35 basis points six months ahead. The rate one year ahead had fallen since the Committee's
previous meeting, but remained much higher than the official repo rate and higher than it had been in
November. The spread between this forward rate and the official repo rate had been close to
1 percentage point for most of the period since late December close to the peaks seen in 1996 and
1999/2000, but below the peak of 1994. The high spread had been consistent with market expectations
of a rise in the repo rate and a pick-up in GDP growth even though, on average in the past, actual
official repo rates had tended to be lower than the rates suggested by earlier forward rates. Longer-
term nominal forward rates at all maturities had also fallen over the month. Real yields had risen at
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maturities beyond ten years. This may partly have reflected the impact of the index-linked gilt auction
on 24 January.
A17
Inflation expectations derived from gilts at all maturities had fallen since the Committee's
previous meeting. The size of the falls may have been exaggerated to the extent that there had been
any effect on real yields from the index-linked gilt auction. Monthly inflation expectations of
participants in HMT's survey for 2002 Q4 had remained unchanged at 2.1%, while the Consensus
Economics year-average forecast for 2002 had fallen to 2.0% in January. Inflation expectations for
2003 from these surveys had been a Q4 value of 2.4% from the HMT survey and a year-average of
2.3% from the Consensus Economics survey.
A18
Quoted credit card rates had fallen by 27 basis points in January. The standard variable rate for
mortgages had remained unchanged in January. The two-year discounted rate had fallen by 1 basis
point. The two-year fixed mortgage rate had risen by 19 basis points, and the spread over two-year
swaps had narrowed.
A19
Spreads over gilts of investment-grade corporate bonds issued in sterling in the Merrill Lynch
aggregate index had fallen since the Committee's previous meeting. Non-gilt sterling bond issuance
had been less strong in January than in December. Retail lending rates to PNFCs had continued to fall
in December.
A20
The FTSE All-Share and FTSE 100 indices had fallen by 3.4% and 3.0% respectively since the
Committee's previous meeting, but were little changed since the end of October. The FTSE Small Cap
and FTSE 250 indices had fallen by 6.2% and 5.3% respectively over the same period. The
information technology and non-cyclical services sectors had been particularly weak. The number of
profit warnings issued in January had fallen slightly compared with December, and had been less than
in January 2001. A decomposition of changes in the FTSE 100 had suggested that, over the previous
six months, the fall of around 5% had been accounted for primarily by weaker reported and prospective
profits. There was little change in the estimate of the equity risk premium over this period as a whole.
The picture was similar for the S&P 500 in the United States.
A21
Since 9 January, the sterling exchange rate index (ERI) had fallen by 0.1% to 106.8. This
reflected a 1.7% depreciation of sterling against the US dollar and a 0.5% appreciation of sterling
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against the euro. Relative movements in nominal yields at shorter maturities would have suggested a
larger depreciation in effective terms, concentrated against the euro.
III
Demand and output
A22
The preliminary ONS estimate of GDP growth in 2001 Q4 had shown quarterly growth easing
to 0.2%, from 0.5% in Q3. Annual GDP growth had slowed to 1.9% in 2001 Q4 from 2.2% in Q3.
Service sector output had risen by 0.9% in Q4, compared with growth of 0.6% in Q3. Within services,
output in the distribution, hotels and catering sector had increased by 0.4% in Q4, down from 1.3% in
Q3.
A23
The December industrial production data had been made available to the Committee in time for
its meeting. Manufacturing output had fallen by 0.5% in December, and by 1.7% in 2001 Q4. The
quarterly fall mainly reflected a sharp fall in the output of the electrical and optical equipment, and
basic metal and metal products, industries.
A24
Retail sales had declined by 0.3% in December. They had risen by 1.3% in 2001 Q4, and by
6.2% in Q4 compared with a year earlier. Looking forward, the Confederation of British Industry
(CBI) survey of distributive trades had suggested that retail sales would continue to be strong over
coming months: the expected sales balance had risen to +25 in February from +19 in January. New
private car registrations had been 25.8% higher in 2001 Q4 than a year earlier, and were 5.1% higher in
January than a year earlier.
A25
The GfK consumer confidence index had risen to +6.4 in January from -0.6 in December. The
MORI measure of consumer confidence had risen to -20 in January from -29 in November. On
business confidence, the CBI Quarterly Industrial Trends business optimism balance had increased
from -54 in October to -31 in January.
A26
The Nationwide house price index had risen by 0.2% in January, and by 2.7% in the three
months to January compared with the three months to October. The Halifax house price index had
risen by 1.6% on the month in January and prices on a three-month basis had been 4.6% higher. The
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors' (RICS) balance of estate agents reporting increased prices
over the previous three months had risen from +29 in December to +46 in January. Particulars
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delivered had fallen by 6,000 to 125,000 in December but were 11.6% higher than a year ago. Loan
approvals had risen slightly to 111,000 in December from 110,000 in the previous month.
A27
Annual net rates of return for PNFCs were broadly unchanged at 12.2% in Q3. Within these,
annual net rates of return for the manufacturing and services sectors were 4.3% and 12.5% respectively
in 2001 Q3. Investment intentions in the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) Q4 survey for both
service sector and manufacturing firms had continued to decline and had been around the lowest since
the early 1990s. The CBI Quarterly Industrial Trends Survey for 2001 Q4 had indicated that
investment intentions had not bounced back after 11 September: the balance of firms expecting to
increase investment in plant and machinery was unchanged at -28 in the January survey compared with
October.
A28
Export and import volume growth for goods had fallen in November: goods exports had fallen
by 4.4% and goods imports by 3.5% in the three months to November compared with the previous
three months. In 2001 Q4, exports of goods to the non-EU had risen by 1.7% on the previous quarter
whilst imports of goods from the non-EU had fallen by 0.1%.
A29
Forward-looking survey data on the service sector had been mixed. The BCC service sector
orders balances had fallen in 2001 Q4: home orders had decreased to +10 from +14 in Q3, whilst
export orders had fallen to -8 from +1 over the same period. The headline Chartered Institute of
Purchasing and Supply (CIPS) services index had risen to 51.4 in December, from 49.4 in November.
The CIPS services incoming new business balance had increased to 51.9 in January from 50.5 in
December.
A30
In manufacturing, the CIPS manufacturing survey in January had shown signs of improvement
in both output and new orders, although both indices had remained below 50. The CBI Quarterly
Industrial Trends survey had indicated an improvement in orders compared with three months ago: the
expected balance had risen to -12 in January from -25 in October. The BCC home order balance had
also shown an improvement: the balance had increased to -6 in 2001 Q4 from -12 in Q3. The CIPS
construction index had risen to 54.0 in January from 52.9 in December.
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IV
Labour market
A31
Labour Force Survey (LFS) employment had increased by 65,000 (0.2%) in the three months to
November 2001, compared with the previous three months. This had reflected rises in both female
employment (37,000) and part-time employment (43,000). At 74.6%, the working-age employment
rate had remained unchanged on the quarter, but had been 0.1 percentage points higher than a year ago.
A32
Despite the growth in employment, the total number of hours worked had fallen by 0.6% in the
September to November period, compared with three months before. Average weekly hours worked
per person employed had fallen by 0.7% in the latest quarter. The fall in hours had largely reflected
lower overtime working.
A33
The CIPS employment surveys for January had suggested that overall employment had
continued to decline at the same pace as in December. This had reflected continued employment falls
in both manufacturing and services, while employment in construction had continued to rise, although
at a slower pace than in December. Forward-looking surveys by the BCC and CBI had suggested a
further weakening of employment intentions in manufacturing and services.
A34
Survey evidence on skill shortages had suggested a mixed picture. The CBI Industrial Trends
survey had reported a sharp fall in manufacturing skill shortages in 2001 Q4, to below its long-run
average. On the other hand, the CBI/PwC survey had suggested that shortages of professionals in
financial services intensified in December and the BCC survey had indicated that the proportion of
firms who faced recruitment difficulties remained high. The latest reports by the Bank's regional
Agents had suggested that skill shortages had been unchanged.
A35
The LFS measure of unemployment had increased by 15,000 in the three months to November
compared with three months earlier, though the rate had remained unchanged at 5.1%. Claimant count
unemployment had been broadly flat over the same period but had risen by 3,200 in December. The
claimant rate had remained unchanged at 3.2%. Claimant outflows had picked up a little in December,
while inflows had remained flat.
A36
Inactivity amongst those of working age had fallen by 15,000 (0.2%) in the three months to
November, compared with the previous three months.
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A37
Whole-economy headline earnings growth, a three-month moving average of the annual
monthly rates, had been 4.2% in November, down 0.1 percentage points from October. This easing in
the headline rate had largely reflected slower headline pay growth in the public (-0.3 percentage points)
and manufacturing (-0.7 percentage points) sectors which had offset higher earnings growth in private
sector services (+0.2 percentage points). The twelve-month growth rate of earnings had fallen back to
3.9% from 4.4% in October. Whole-economy regular pay growth (not seasonally adjusted) had also
fallen, from 5% in October to 4.6% in November. The contribution of bonuses reduced whole-
economy earnings growth by 0.9 percentage points (not seasonally adjusted) in November.
A38
The Bank's AEI-weighted twelve-month mean measure of whole-economy settlements had been
unchanged in December at 3.3%. It had been unchanged since April. On the basis of information
available at the time of the meeting, it had appeared that settlements for January were turning out to be
a little lower than the December figures.
A39
Details of the 2002-03 settlement for teachers in England and Wales covered by the School
Teachers' Review Body had been announced on 23 January. The average settlement had been an
increase of 3.5% in 2002-03 compared with 3.7% last year. The settlement for those members of the
Armed Forces covered by the Armed Forces Pay Review Board had been announced on 29 January.
The average settlement had been an increase of 3.7%, the same as last year. Both settlements were due
to take effect on 1 April.
V
Prices
A40
The Bank's sterling commodity price index had risen by 0.8% between November and
December. Prices of metals had fallen by 4.6% in December but this had been more than offset by a
1.2% rise in the prices of domestic food and a 1.0% rise in the price of fuels. The annual inflation rate
of the commodity price index had picked up to -6.8% in December from -11.8% in November.
A41
Oil prices had been volatile over recent months, but had remained at low levels following the
sharp fall at the end of September 2001. In January, average sterling oil prices had been about 6%
higher than their average level in December.
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A42
Manufacturing input prices had fallen by 0.7% in December, as a 4.7% fall in crude oil prices
had more than offset a 1.2% rise in domestic food prices. Annual input price deflation had eased
sharply because of base effects, but prices were still 6.6% lower than a year earlier. Looking ahead, the
CIPS manufacturing survey had continued to point to falling input prices. The input price balance had
fallen to 39.3 in January, from 40.8 in December.
A43
Manufacturing output prices both including and excluding duties (PPIY) had been unchanged
between November and December. The annual inflation rate of total output prices had risen to -1.2%
and that of PPIY had been unchanged at -0.4% in December.
A44
Output prices had risen by less than manufacturers' total weighted costs since mid-1997. In
2001, weighted costs growth had eased significantly as falls in input prices had been offset by rises in
unit labour costs. The CBI Quarterly Trends survey had shown that both average unit costs and output
prices were expected to fall in 2002 Q1 the balances had been -11 and -23 respectively.
A45
The CIPS service sector survey had shown a rise in the average prices charged index to 51.1 in
January from 49.8 in December, and a rise in the average input prices to 53.7 in January from 51.1 in
December.
A46
Annual RPIX inflation had risen by 0.1 percentage points to 1.9% in December. The rise had
mainly reflected rises of 0.2 percentage points in annual goods price inflation to -0.3%, and 0.1
percentage points in annual services price inflation, to 4.1%. There were no major changes in the
contributions of any of the individual components. Annual RPI inflation had fallen by 0.2 percentage
points to 0.7% in December. Annual RPIY inflation had risen to 2.3% in December from 2.2% in
November, while annual HICP inflation had risen by 0.2 percentage points to 1.0% in December.
VI
Reports by the Bank's Agents
A47
The Bank's regional Agents had reported that manufacturing output and orders had continued to
fall, and that there had been no clear sign of any slowing in the rate of decline. Aerospace output had
fallen further and there had been no signs of recovery in the ICT sector. Manufacturers supplying to
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the consumer market had continued to report modest growth in output. The trend to moving production
away from the United Kingdom had intensified.
A48
Overall, there had been an improvement in activity in the service sector. Growth in consumer
services output had remained robust. There had been a recovery in overseas holiday bookings, except
to the United States. Contacts had also reported an increase in demand for domestic holidays. There
had been a slight recovery in output growth in the business services sector, following a particularly
sharp decline in growth after 11 September.
A49
Construction output growth had stabilised at a high level. Within this, there had been an easing
in commercial and industrial construction. But demand for retail construction had remained robust, and
there had been continued strong growth in demand from the public sector. The housing market had
remained strong, although house price inflation had begun to ease for properties at the top end of the
market.
A50
Growth in retail sales had continued to increase. Contacts had reported that spending
immediately before Christmas and in the `sales' afterwards had been higher than during the same
period in 2000. Sales of new and used cars had remained very strong.
A51
Raw materials costs had continued to fall, offsetting increases in the price of non-material costs,
particularly insurance. Falls in raw material prices had generally fed through to manufacturers' output
prices. Retail prices had been stable. There were reports that January discounting had been on a
narrower range of stock in 2002 than in 2001, due to better stock control by retailers.
A52
The Bank's regional Agents had conducted an informal survey of around 280 firms on the
prospects for earnings growth in 2002. Of the firms sampled that had a company-wide settlement, 15%
had expected it to be higher in percentage terms in 2002 than in 2001, while 33% had expected their
settlement to be lower. Growth in total pay per employee in 2002 compared with 2001 had been
expected to be higher by 28% of the respondents, while 34% had expected it to be lower. The outlook
for inflation had been highlighted as the main downward pressure on pay growth in 2002. The main
source of upward pressures cited was the recruitment and retention of staff, especially in the retail and
construction sectors.
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A53
In reports outside the survey, Agents had noted falls in manufacturing employment and a further
easing in service sector employment. But recruitment had remained strong in the public sector and in
the leisure services and construction industries.
VII
Market intelligence
A54
Since the previous Committee meeting, rates implied by short sterling futures contracts had
fallen. Rates implied by the contract expiring in March 2002 had fallen by 16 basis points over the
period, and those by the December 2002 contract by 48 basis points, to 5.03%. These falls partly
reflected lower-than-expected retail sales data, and also perhaps some reversal of technical factors after
the year-end. In common with rates implied by eurodollar and euribor contracts, implied rates had
fallen following Chairman Greenspan's comments on 11 January. Following Chairman Greenspan's
comments on 24 January and higher-than-expected UK GDP data on 25 January, some of the fall in
implied rates had been reversed. Towards the end of the period, implied rates had fallen in response to
falls in world equity prices, and weaker-than-expected non-farm payrolls and ISM data.
A55
Market participants had generally expected the Committee not to change the Bank's official
repo rate in February. Similarly, economists polled by Reuters between 29 and 31 January had
attached a mean probability of only 22% to a reduction in the Bank's official repo rate. In line with
information from short sterling futures contracts, a majority of traders had expected the official rate to
increase before the end of 2002.
A56
The US dollar had appreciated in effective terms by 1.3% since the Committee's previous
meeting and had reached a new 15-year high of 124.9 on 25 January. Market participants had
attributed the dollar's rise to an improved outlook for the US economy in comparison with other areas.
Sterling had depreciated by 0.1% in effective terms and had traded in the top half of its range for last
year of 104 to 108; it had risen by 0.5% against the euro but had fallen by 1.7% against the dollar.
Sterling's movements had appeared to be influenced mainly by external factors, as there had been
relatively little reaction from the foreign exchange market to UK domestic news.