mpc: 6
It was not clear how long these disrupted conditions would persist. The deterioration in the US
housing market, and the attendant rise in defaults and foreclosures, might carry on for some time.
Committee members noted that eventually market participants should be able to re-evaluate the risks
involved, re-price the relevant securities and probably re-assess the price of credit more generally,
discriminating better between different assets. The adjustment process should be temporary but overly
compressed credit risk premia in markets had been an issue for some time, as discussed in past issues
of the Bank's
Financial Stability Review and
Report, and a sustained re-pricing of credit risk would
not, in itself, be unwelcome. It was likely that a degree of de-leveraging by some market participants
would take place, which could affect a wider set of financial markets while the transition was made.
The faster all these changes happened, the sooner market activity would start to normalise, and it was
possible that this might happen quite quickly. Once these processes were complete, the demand for
additional liquidity, and the associated rise in LIBOR spreads, should fall back. But September was a
month when a large proportion of ABCP was expected to mature in a short time interval so, in advance
of that, money market liquidity could become increasingly concentrated at overnight and very short-
term maturities, unless ABCP conduits were able to re-issue paper, or banks could put alternative
funding in place. And some of the structured investment vehicles had less access to committed
liquidity lines (although they would also have a higher proportion of medium-term funding). Quarter-
end results for many financial firms would reveal the extent of any losses through this period, although
the valuation of some instruments was difficult where there was little trading taking place. So the
adjustment path might well not be smooth.
Make a comment: