mpc:
9
estimated for any other industrialised country. It was, therefore, desirable to consider whether official
policy could do anything to mitigate this. It was noted in that context that the textbook response would
be fiscal policy tightening. But that kind of active use of fiscal policy was forsworn under the current
fiscal framework, and it was observed that fiscal policy had in fact tightened over the past few years.
As to monetary policy, whether the Committee's remit was in principle consistent with taking these
concerns into account depended on whether there were different paths of interest rates which could
achieve the inflation target but which might have different implications for the exchange rate. It was
noted that an interest rate policy which helped to sustain sterling at current or higher levels ran
significant risks with the inflation target at some future point when sterling could fall sharply. In the
interests of making it easier to meet the inflation target at all times, an interest rate path now that helped
to keep sterling lower would be desirable. On the other hand, an interest rate policy which sought to
offset the current strength of sterling would risk fuelling domestic demand, which could have adverse
implications for inflation further ahead.
35
It was in any event unclear what, if anything, the Committee could do to address these wider
concerns given the current conjuncture of market expectations. The market was firmly expecting a
25 basis point rise in the Bank's repo rate. Some members believed that if that were the Committee's
decision, there would be little change in either the exchange rate or in money market rates. Some other
members were concerned that a tightening of policy, even though expected, could have the effect of
putting further upward pressure on sterling when the
Inflation Report was released, by making it appear
a `one way bet' in the short run.
36
There was also a range of views on the likely market reaction to a decision to maintain the repo
rate at 5.75%. Some members thought that, particularly given the
Inflation Report projection, it was
likely that the market would conclude that a rate rise had simply been deferred, and possibly even that
the official rate would end up having to go higher than otherwise. In that case, sterling's exchange rate
would be supported and might even rise rather than falling back. Some other members thought that it
might be possible to explain a `no change' decision in a way which avoided that risk and which might
create conditions in which sterling eased back. RPIX inflation had been below the 2½% target for nine
months and, on current evidence, was set to remain so over the coming year. This profile might make a
`wait and see' policy feasible and could potentially provide a safe background against which to explain
publicly that inflation would undershoot the target if both sterling and interest rates remained at their
current levels. That might help to dent any `one way bet' element in sterling's short-run strength. In
addition, these members doubted that sterling would rise sustainably on a `no change' decision, because
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